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Is a Strip Club More Harmful Than a Dirty
Bookstore? Navigating a Circuit Split in Municipal
Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses
I. INTRODUCTION
While millions of Americans indulge in pornography,1 most
people do not want it sold in their neighborhood. As a result, most
cities have passed zoning regulations that govern where sexually
oriented businesses may operate. Given First Amendment rights that
protect sexually explicit “speech,” cities must justify their regulations
by pointing to studies that link the targeted businesses to a variety of
societal and economic ills.2 In light of recent federal court decisions,
however, there is now an open question as to whether those studies,
some of which cities have relied upon for decades, are good enough
to survive heightened scrutiny. The continued validity of municipal
regulations across the country depends on the answer.
In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,3 the Supreme
Court—in upholding a city’s regulation of sexually oriented
businesses—admonished that, while municipalities must not meet “a
high bar,”4 they “[cannot] get away with shoddy data or
reasoning.”5 Instead, the evidence a city relies upon to meet its initial
burden of showing a substantial interest in the regulation “must
fairly support the municipality’s rationale for its ordinance.”6 The
Supreme Court’s admonishment does not purport to suddenly

1. See Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics, Top Ten Reviews, http://
internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html#anchor6
(last
visited Oct. 28, 2008).
2. That is, cities must justify regulations in terms of preventing the negative secondary
effects that have been linked to sexually oriented businesses. For further discussion of
secondary effects, see infra Part II.B.
3. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
4. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (“The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such
an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already
generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”).
5. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438.
6. Id.
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subject a city’s evidence to scrutiny under the framework found in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;7 instead, a more
accurate reading might be that a city planner’s observations scribbled
on the back of a napkin should be rejected. But in the wake of the
Alameda Books decision, a split has emerged between the Fifth8 and
the Tenth9 Circuits as to whether the overwhelming majority of
existing studies constitute “shoddy data or reasoning” when used to
justify broad zoning ordinances affecting every type of adult
business. This divide is likely to widen even further as other federal
circuits inevitably encounter the same question as cities across the
country rush to drive purveyors of pornography to their fringes and
beyond.
The Tenth Circuit has held that on-site and off-site adult
businesses10 are “reasonably similar businesses,” that will have
reasonably similar effects, and under the Supreme Court’s standard,
it is up to the ordinance’s opponent to show otherwise.11 But the
Fifth Circuit took a decidedly different view, holding that cities
cannot rely on studies that do not differentiate between on-site
sexually oriented businesses and off-site sexually oriented
businesses.12 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that it is not reasonable to
assume these businesses carry the same negative secondary effects.13

7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Daubert decision established the current evidentiary
standard for scientific evidence admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under this
standard all scientific evidence must “not only [be] relevant, but reliable. Id. at 589. Thus,
before admitting scientific evidence a judge will be required to make “a preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at
592–93. In making this determination the judge must consider, in addition to other factors:
whether a theory or technique “can be tested”; whether it has been “subjected to peer review
and publication”; whether there is a “known or potential rate of error”; and whether the
evidence has been “generally accepted.” Id. at 594.
8. See H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2007); Encore
Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003).
9. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006).
10. At their core, the difference between these businesses is where patrons consume the
adult materials for sale—either by viewing the materials “on-site,” as in the case of an adult
movie theatre, or by purchasing adult products for use “off-site,” as in the case of an adult
bookstore. For a more thorough explanation of the differences between these two businesses
see infra Part II.B.
11. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1167–68.
12. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 295.
13. See id. at 294–95.
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As a result, under what is now the controlling precedent in the
Fifth Circuit, a city seeking to regulate off-site sexually oriented
businesses must undertake the great expense of commissioning an
entirely new study to prove the seemingly obvious: that an adult
bookstore wedged between an elementary school and homes in a
suburban neighborhood may result in negative secondary effects on
the surrounding area, such as decreased property value. This is not
the law as envisioned by the Supreme Court in Alameda Books.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach
properly interprets the Supreme Court by providing deference to
cities at the initial stages of litigation while still ensuring that cities
are ultimately not relying on “shoddy data or reasoning.”14 The Fifth
Circuit has improperly interpreted the initial evidentiary burden a
city must meet when proving secondary effects by forcing
municipalities to differentiate between on- and off-site businesses.
Although a city cannot rely on shoddy evidence in zoning adult
businesses, the Supreme Court never meant to create such a high bar
for cities to overcome in meeting their initial burdens.15 While the
First Amendment rights of those owning and operating sexually
oriented businesses are well established, the protection of those
rights does not require an evidentiary burden so high that cities are
unable to address potentially serious problems that may affect their
citizens.16
Part II.A of this Comment briefly outlines pornography’s rise in
popularity and its current position within the American marketplace.
Part II.B addresses how cities have used studies of adult businesses in
zoning regulations and explains the differences between on- and offsite sexually oriented businesses. Part III.A discusses the standard
established by the Supreme Court in cases where zoning ordinances
affect sexually oriented businesses, including the Court’s latest

14. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1165 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality opinion)); see also id. at 1168–69.
15. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (specifically refusing to set a high bar for cities
“that want to address merely the secondary effects of protected speech”); see also id. at 451
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]e have consistently held that a city must have latitude to
experiment, at least at the outset, and . . . very little evidence is required.”).
16. See id. at 445 (“If a city can decrease the crime and blight associated with certain
speech by the traditional exercise of its zoning power, and at the same time leave the quantity
and accessibility of speech substantially undiminished, there is no First Amendment
objection.”).
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decision in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.17 Part III.B
focuses on how this standard has been interpreted by the Tenth and
Fifth circuits with regard to zoning ordinances regulating on- and
off-site sexually oriented businesses. Part IV argues that the Tenth
Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court jurisprudence is
correct because (A) the initial burden established by the Supreme
Court is not exacting, (B) it allows for an appropriate level of
deference to cities enacting ordinances, and (C) it allows for the
consideration of the differences between different adult businesses at
later stages of litigation. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE RISE OF PORNOGRAPHY AND CITIES’ EFFORTS
TO POLICE IT
A. The Increased Popularity of Pornography
The camera was invented in 1839 and within two years (and
possibly sooner), it was used to take nude pictures in France.18 The
creation and distribution of these pictures quickly became a
commercial endeavor.19 Following a rough start in the United States
where these images were largely outlawed during the nineteenth and
early half of the twentieth centuries, pornography has continued to
grow in popularity to its present status.20 Its phenomenal growth has
encouraged the proliferation of distribution outlets, and thousands
of eager entrepreneurs have stepped forward to meet the increasing
demand for pornography.21
Based on numbers alone, it seems Americans have a love affair
with pornography.22 Steven Hirsch, one of the founding partners of

17. 535 U.S. 425.
18. See FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF
PORNOGRAPHY IN THE CYBER AGE 41–46 (2001).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Indeed, the demand for pornography has even produced guidebooks to help eager
consumers wade through the mountains of material and distribution outlets on the market
today. See, e.g., J.P. DANKO, LIVE NUDE GIRLS: THE TOP 100 STRIP CLUBS IN NORTH
AMERICA (1998); see also LANE, supra note 18, at 186–87 (discussing different guides available
for sexually oriented businesses).
22. But not necessarily in High Definition. See Matt Ritchel, In Raw World of Sex
Movies, High Definition Could Be a View Too Real, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/business/media/22porn.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
(discussing the difficulties adult film makers encounter when filming in High Definition).
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Vivid Entertainment, reported revenues in excess of $100 million last
year based on sales of its adult videos, X-rated comic books, and a set
of official Vivid Entertainment custom car wheels.23 And that is only
the beginning. The pornography industry, once associated primarily
with lonely trench coat-wearing customers looking both ways before
ducking into an adult bookstore, has increasingly encroached into
suburbia and now grosses nearly $14 billion annually,24 making it
bigger than “professional football, basketball and baseball put
together.”25 Not surprisingly, increased scrutiny and criticism26 have
accompanied pornography’s foray into the lucrative mainstream, and
cities have rushed to assure their residents that they will not have to
worry about one of those establishments opening in their
neighborhood.27 However, like political campaigning or religious
proselytizing, pornography is constitutionally protected speech
(although to a lesser extent).28 As a result, cities and municipalities
across the nation now find themselves at a difficult crossroad, trying
to appease their citizens’ cries that they run sexually oriented
businesses out of town—or at least to the seedier fringes of town, far

23. Seth Lubove, Obscene Profits, FORBES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 99. In addition to films,
Vivid lends it name out to “a vodka line, videogames, a Las Vegas night club, virilityenhancement concoctions, X-rated comic books and even a set of custom car wheels.” Id. at
100.
24. Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, at 51, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E0DD173AF933A15756C0A9679C
8B63.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) (arguing that pornography is one method used to maintain gender
inequality). “What Pornography does goes beyond its content: It eroticizes hierarchy, it
sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and submission sex. Inequality is its central dynamic;
the illusion of freedom coming together with the reality of force is central to its working.” Id.
at 18 (emphasis in original). See also Gordon B. Hinckley, A Tragic Evil Among Us, LIAHONA,
Nov. 2004 at 59–62 (leader of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints exhorting
members to avoid pornography):
Now brethren, the time has come for any one of us who is so involved to pull
himself out of the mire, to stand above this evil thing, to “look to God and live.”
We do not have to view salacious magazines. We do not have to read books laden
with smut . . . we can do better than this.
Id. at 62.
27. See, e.g., David M. Halbfinger, Adult Bookstore Roils Lindenhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 1987, at A13; Mike Charbonneau, Tarboro Residents in Battle to Ban Adult Bookstore, Feb.
12, 2008, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/2428655/.
28. See Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“Sexual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”).
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from schools, churches, and Costco—without running afoul of the
First Amendment.
B. The “Secondary Effects” Approach and the Studies That Drive It
The erosion of society’s moral values and the debasement of
women are not permissible grounds for a city to regulate
pornography under the First Amendment. However, many cities and
municipalities have successfully regulated sexually oriented businesses
through zoning ordinances based on studies showing the presence of
negative secondary effects in communities where adult businesses
have chosen to locate.29 Some of the secondary effects recognized by
the courts have included higher crime rates, a decline in real estate
values, and overall neighborhood decline.30
The Supreme Court has historically shown considerable
deference to cities that make this determination, generally upholding
ordinances that restrict the locations of sexually oriented businesses
based on secondary effects so long as the municipality’s studies make
an initial showing of a substantial government interest in
regulation.31 In cases such as these, the Supreme Court employs a
burden-shifting scheme whereby cities enacting zoning regulations
affecting adult businesses must meet an initial evidentiary burden
showing a substantial government interest in regulation of these
businesses.32 The burden then shifts to the opponent of the
regulation to “cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by
demonstrating that the municipality’s evidence does not support its
rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality’s
29. See, e.g., LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. I, art. 2, § 12.70 (2007); BROWARD
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF BROWARD COUNTY ch. 20, art. XVI (1993); BROOKLYN PARK,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 152.343 (2007); FALCON HEIGHTS, MINN., CITY CODE §
113; KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. II (1998); OKLAHOMA CITY,
OKLA., MUN. CODE §30-407 (2008); DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 41A-13 (2007); NEWPORT
NEWS, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 45-524 (2007); LYNNWOOD, WASH., MUN. CODE §
21.46.120 (2000); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 23.49.030 (2007).
30. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 430 (2002)
(plurality opinion) (citing a study which indicated higher crime rates); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44 (1986) (discussing a statute which was enacted based
on a concern about the “severe” effect of sexually oriented businesses on “surrounding
businesses and residencies”); H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 339–40
(5th Cir. 2007) (examining a survey of real estate appraisers).
31. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39; Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 51–52;
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
32. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39.
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factual findings.”33 If the opponent succeeds in casting doubt
through either method, the burden then shifts back to the
municipality to “supplement the record with evidence renewing
support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”34 A critical part of
this analysis is the city’s burden to show that sexually oriented
businesses cause harmful secondary effects. Problematically, in some
jurisdictions such studies must now survive a more rigorous standard
of evidence.
Therein lies the potential problem.
Most studies undertaken to date—upon which cities across the
country have relied to support regulations of sexually oriented
businesses—treated
sexually
oriented
businesses
as
one
indistinguishable group.35 However, some jurisdictions now
recognize a distinction between on- and off-site sexually oriented
businesses.
This distinction is based largely on where customers consume the
adult products these businesses offer.36 On-site adult establishments

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., CITY OF AMARILLO, TEX., REPORT ON ZONING AND OTHER METHODS OF
REGULATING ADULT ENTERTAINMENT IN AMARILLO (1977); CITY OF AUSTIN, TEX., REPORT
ON ADULT ORIENTED BUSINESSES IN AUSTIN (1986); CITY OF DETROIT, MICH., DETROIT’S
APPROACH TO REGULATING “ADULT” USES (1972); CITY OF KENT, WASH., CITY OF KENT
ADULT USE ZONING STUDY (1982); CITY OF L.A., CAL., STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE
CONCENTRATION OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE CITY OF LOS
ANGELES (1977); CITY OF PHOENIX, ARIZ., RELATION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND ADULT
BUSINESSES (1979).
36. Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1166 (10th Cir. 2006). Another
distinction courts must consider in this context, besides the classification of on-site or off-site,
is whether an off-site business can be fairly classified as a sexually oriented business for purposes
of zoning regulations. See, e.g., id. at 1154. It is relatively easy to say that the regulations
should apply to a store that carries only adult videos and novelties; however, it is less clear for a
shop that carries only a few novelty items on one of its shelves. Id. at 1158. The danger is that
zoning regulations could apply to “[a] garden-variety book or music store[] with restricted
adult sections,” such as a Barnes and Noble or a neighborhood magazine shop. Encore Videos,
Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 294 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003). In addressing this
problem, courts have consistently rejected ordinances that have classified stores with ten or
twenty percent of their inventory dedicated to adult products as sexually oriented businesses.
See, e.g., Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 352 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir. 2003)
(clarifying the Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision, Encore Videos, 330 F.3d 288, to include that the
statute in question was not narrowly tailored because of “its low 20% inventory requirement”);
World Wide Video v. City of Tukwila, 816 P.2d 18, 21 (Wash. 1991) (invalidating an
ordinance which regulated business devoting ten percent or more of their inventory to adult
materials). Instead, only stores with “a significant or substantial portion of their stock or floor
space” devoted to adult materials should be subject to these types of regulations. See Doctor
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include businesses that allow patrons to view or experience the
sexually oriented materials “on-site”—for example, strip clubs,
pornographic theaters, or any adult business offering live
entertainment or viewing booths.37 In contrast, off-site sexually
oriented businesses, or “take home” adult businesses, sell sexually
oriented “video tapes, DVD’s, magazines, and other print materials,”
but do not allow the materials to be “viewed or consumed on the
premises”—they must be taken “off-site.”38 The operative question
now faced by courts across the country is whether this distinction
matters when considering a city’s evidence under the standard set
forth in Alameda Books.39

John’s, 465 F.3d at 1154 (internal quotations omitted). For a discussion of the
constitutionality of the above-quoted language, see id. at 1157–61. Limiting classification to
only those businesses with a larger stock of adult materials is consistent with the very purpose
behind adult business zoning regulations—curtailing negative secondary effects. See Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47. To meet constitutional scrutiny, zoning ordinances must be directed
toward the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses, and, thus, must be limited to
those businesses that can be reasonably expected to produce these secondary effects.
37. H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2007). A
viewing booth is commonly understood as a booth or small room provided by an adult
business in which patrons may view pornographic videos or materials.
38. Id. at 338.
39. Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz, and Bradley Shafer argue that many of the studies used by
cities in meeting their initial burden have not been required to adhere to “a set of
methodological criteria or minimum standards” and, as such, cities may be “relying on flawed
databases.” Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz & Bradley Shafer, Government Regulation of “Adult”
Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative
Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355, 366 (2001). Paul, Linz, and Shafer argue that
any studies used by cities should conform to the factors listed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which dealt with determining the reliability of
expert testimony, including “the notion of falsifiability, peer review and publication, error rate
and adherence to professional standards.” Paul et al., supra. While this is an interesting
argument, Alameda Books and its related cases have never required this type of evidence—
evidence to meet a city’s initial burden need only be “reasonably believed to be relevant” and
“fairly support the municipalities’ rationale.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (quoting
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 51–52). Moreover, cities have successfully relied on such
evidence, ranging from professional studies to citizen testimony. See, e.g., World Wide Video,
Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at
44. Neither is it proper or necessary for the Court to adopt such a requirement in the future.
As the case law stands now, the burden of casting doubt on a city’s reasoning rests on the
plaintiff, who can point these problems out to the judge. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439.
Requiring cities to use only studies complying with the Daubert standard would only serve to
increase the cost of conducting studies and decrease a city’s flexibility to address problems
reasonably linked to adult businesses. See Abilene Retail #30, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 492 F.3d
1164, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Nor is there a constitutional requirement that the studies
relied upon be empirical or satisfy any particular methodological or scientific standards—
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III. “SHODDY EVIDENCE?”: THE ALAMEDA BOOKS STANDARD AND
ITS INTERPRETATION
A. Content-Neutral Regulation and Alameda Books
As a preliminary matter, in order to comply with the First
Amendment, zoning ordinances aimed at regulating adult businesses
must be “time, place, and manner regulations,” meaning that they
are not aimed at the content of the speech but rather at the
secondary effects of adult businesses on the surrounding
community.40 In examining these “content-neutral”41 regulations,
courts employ a standard of intermediate scrutiny through a burdenshifting analysis.42 Under this analysis, cities have the initial burden
of showing that a regulation is “designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest and [does] not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication.”43 This section will address the three
main cases the Supreme Court has considered that deal with zoning
ordinances regulating sexually oriented businesses: Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc.;44 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.;45 and City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.46 The
overarching theme of these cases, consistent with the Supreme
Court’s lower standard of review, is the low initial burden of proof
placed upon municipalities, along with the deference afforded to
cities enacting these ordinances.47

legislators are free to consider anecdotal evidence, statistical data, prior cases, and their
common sense.”).
40. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47.
41. Id.
42. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439–40. This is a lower standard than strict scrutiny. In
order for an ordinance to survive strict scrutiny the government must show “a compelling
governmental interest in limiting speech, and the regulation must be narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest.” 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 827 (2005). In addition, “the
government must choose the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
43. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47.
44. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
45. 475 U.S. 41.
46. 535 U.S. 425.
47. Id. at 440 (“There is less reason to be concerned that municipalities will use these
ordinances to discriminate against unpopular speech.”); see also id. at 449 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“As a matter of common experience, these sorts of ordinances are more like a
zoning restriction on slaughterhouses and less like a tax on unpopular newspapers. The zoning
context provides a built-in legitimate rationale, which rebuts the usual presumption that
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1. Pre-Alameda Books cases
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of
zoning ordinances aimed at sexually oriented businesses in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.48 In 1972, the city of Detroit enacted a
zoning ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from locating “within
1,000 feet of any two other ‘regulated uses’ or within 500 feet of a
residential area.” 49 The city heard evidence regarding the secondary
effects of sexually oriented business and passed the ordinance in an
effort to reduce these negative effects on the community.50 Two
adult theaters in violation of the ordinance brought suit claiming
that the regulation violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.51 Noting that “the city’s interest in attempting to preserve the
quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect,”52 a
majority of the Court held that the ordinance was a constitutional,
content-neutral regulation because the evidence presented by the
city—which demonstrated negative secondary effects—established a
substantial government interest.53
Ten years later, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,54 the
Court once again considered a zoning ordinance directed at sexually
oriented businesses. Renton’s ordinance was similar to the zoning
restrictions in Young in that it focused on regulating the location of
adult theaters.55 The city originally considered the ordinance at the

content-based restrictions are unconstitutional.”); Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 52 (“It is not
our function to appraise the wisdom of the city’s decision . . . . [T]he city must be allowed a
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.” (internal
citations omitted)).
48. 427 U.S. 50.
49. Id. at 52. Within the term “regulated use” the ordinance also included “10 different
kinds of establishments in addition to adult theaters,” including “mini” theaters, adult
bookstores, cabarets, bars, hotels and motels, pawnshops, pool halls, public lodging houses,
secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. Id. at 52 n.3.
50. Id.; see also id. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (“That evidence consisted of
reports and affidavits from sociologists and urban planning experts, as well as some laymen, on
the cycle of decay that had been started in areas of other cities, and that could be expected in
Detroit, from the influx and concentration of such establishments.”).
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 71 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[There is
no] doubt that the interests furthered by this ordinance are both important and substantial.”).
53. Id. at 72–73 (plurality opinion); id. at 82–84 (Powell, J., concurring).
54. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
55. Id. at 44. An adult theater was defined as “an enclosed building used for presenting
motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any such visual media, distinguished
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urging of the mayor of Renton, and enacted the regulation in
1981.56 The city council reviewed a number of studies concerning
the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses on surrounding
communities in making its decision to enact the regulation.57
Unlike Young, however, at the time Renton enacted its zoning
ordinance there were no restricted businesses located within the
city,58 and the city did not conduct any studies of its own. Instead,
the municipality relied heavily on studies conducted in other
municipalities.59 Two adult theater owners challenged the ordinance
on constitutional grounds.60 Although the ordinance was upheld by
the district court, upon review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed.61 The appellate court reasoned that Renton had
“improperly relied upon the experiences of other cities in lieu of
evidence about the effects of adult theaters on Renton,” and, thus

or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to specified sexual
activities or specified anatomical areas . . . for observation by patrons therein.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id. The ordinance was “designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade,
maintain property values, and generally protect and preserve the quality of the city’s
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.” Id. at 48 (internal
quotations omitted).
58. Compare id. at 44 (illustrating the lack of such restricted businesses in the city) with
Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 54–55 & n.8 (1976) (explaining that adult
theaters and bookstores were added to the ordinance in response to a report concerning “the
significant growth in the number of such establishments,” from two in 1967 to twenty-five in
1972).
59. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 50–51. In particular, the City of Renton relied on
studies produced by the City of Seattle, Washington, where, “as in Renton, the adult theater
zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence of even
one [adult] theater in a given neighborhood.” Id. at 50. In discussing the study, the Supreme
Court quoted parts of a Washington State Supreme Court decision upholding the zoning
ordinances based on these studies:
“The amendments to the City’s zoning code which are at issue here are the
culmination of a long period of study and discussion of the problems of adult movie
theatres in residential areas of the City . . . . [T]he City’s Department of Community
Development made a study of the need for zoning controls of adult theatres . . . .
The study analyzed the City’s zoning scheme, comprehensive plan, and land uses
around existing adult motion picture theatres . . . .”
Id. at 50–51 (quoting Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1154–55
(Wash. 1978)).
60. Id. at 45.
61. Id. at 43.
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had failed to show the presence of a substantial government
interest.62
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, holding
that Renton had provided sufficient evidence to prove a substantial
government interest.63 The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit had
imposed “an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof” upon the city in
requiring it to present studies “specifically relating to the particular
problems or needs of Renton.”64 Instead, the Court held that “[t]he
First Amendment does not require a city . . . to conduct new studies
or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other
cities, so long as . . . [the] evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”65 In
justifying its ruling, the Court cited its earlier decision in Young
holding that cities should have a “reasonable opportunity to
experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”66
2. Alameda Books: A more rigorous standard?
Despite the Court’s holding in Renton, the standard for proving
a government interest remained unclear. Thus, in City of Los Angeles
v. Alameda Books, Inc.,67 the Court expressly granted certiorari in
order to “clarify the standard for determining whether an ordinance
serves a substantial government interest” as established in Renton
and Young.68 The ordinance at issue in Alameda Books was originally
passed in 1978, based on a 1977 study conducted by the City of Los
Angeles showing that “concentrations of adult businesses” were
linked to higher crime rates in the surrounding communities.69 In an

62. Id. at 46.
63. Id. at 54–55 (“In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid
governmental response to the ‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult theaters. Renton
has not used ‘the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression,’ but rather has sought
to make some areas available for adult theaters and their patrons, while at the same time
preserving the quality of life in the community at large. . . . This, after all, is the essence of
zoning.”) (internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 50 (internal quotations omitted).
65. Id. at 51–52.
66. Id. at 52 (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
67. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
68. Id. at 433 (plurality opinion).
69. Id at 430–31. Specifically, the study showed an increase in “prostitution, robbery,
assaults, and thefts in surrounding communities.” Id. at 430.
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effort to disperse these businesses and decrease the cited negative
secondary effects, the ordinance, like those at issue in Young and
Renton, prohibited adult business from locating within a certain
distance of residential areas or other sexually oriented businesses.70
Shortly after passing the ordinance, however, the city realized that it
contained “a loophole permitting the concentration of multiple adult
enterprises in a single structure.”71 The city subsequently amended
the ordinance in 1983, to prohibit “the establishment or
maintenance of more than one adult entertainment business in the
same building, structure or portion thereof.”72
Two adult establishments—an adult bookstore and an adult
arcade, both providing on-site entertainment73 and operating within
the same commercial space—brought suit, challenging the
ordinance’s constitutionality under the First Amendment.74 The
district court granted summary judgment for the adult businesses
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the city had not
presented evidence “upon which it could reasonably rely to
demonstrate a link between multiple-use adult establishments and
negative secondary effects.”75

70. Id.
71. Id. at 431. The actual language of the Code provided that “‘the distance between
any two adult entertainment businesses shall be measured in a straight line . . . from the closest
exterior structural wall of each business.’” Id. (quoting LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE §
12.70(D) (1978)). This language prevented two separately housed adult businesses from
locating within the prohibited 1000 feet of one another. However, the language did not
prevent two or more separate adult establishments from locating within the same building.
Thus, under the language in effect in the original ordinance, adult businesses could group
together in a sort of mini-mall or “department store” of adult businesses, which is exactly what
happened in this case. Id. at 431–33.
72. Id. at 431 (citing LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.70(C) (1983)).
73. Both businesses are properly classified as on-site sexually oriented businesses despite
one being labeled an “adult bookstore” because both businesses allowed on-site consumption
of adult materials by providing “booths where patrons [could] view videocassettes [on-site] for
a fee.” See id. at 432.
74. Id. The Los Angeles ordinance defined an adult bookstore as “an operation that ‘has
as a substantial portion of its stock-in-trade and offers for sale’ printed matter and
videocassettes that emphasize the depiction of specified sexual activities.” Id. at 431 (citing
LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.70(B)(2)(a) (1983)). An adult arcade is defined as “an
operation where, ‘for any form of consideration,’ five or fewer patrons together may view films
or videocassettes that emphasize the depiction of specified sexual activities.” Id. at 431–32
(citing LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.70(B)(1)).
75. Id. at 429–30.
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Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,76
finding that a city is not required to prove that its approach is the
only valid response to the demonstrated secondary effects.77 The
Court specifically “refused to set such a high bar for municipalities”
attempting to meet their initial burdens by showing a substantial
government interest.78 Instead the Court stated that, in meeting its
initial burden, a city “may rely on any evidence that is ‘reasonably
believed to be relevant’ for demonstrating a connection between
speech and a substantial, independent government interest.”79 In
providing this evidence, however, the Court cautioned that a city
may not rely on “shoddy data or reasoning”; rather, the city’s
evidence “must fairly support the municipality’s rationale for its
ordinance.”80 Under the Court’s analysis, once the government
proves a substantial government interest, the burden then shifts to
the plaintiff to “cast direct doubt on this rationale,” by proving
either the evidence does not support the city’s conclusions, or
through evidence “[disputing] the municipality’s factual findings.”81
If a plaintiff is successful in meeting this burden, the city must then
“supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory
that justifies its ordinance.”82
Finally, the Court reiterated the maxim set down in Young and
Renton that a city “must be given a ‘reasonable opportunity to
experiment with solutions’ to address the secondary effects of
protected speech.”83 The Court explained that, in some instances, a
city may implement “an innovative solution,” and in such a situation
a municipality would have no evidence to show the reliability of its
proposed solution because it had never been implemented before.84

76. Id. at 430.
77. Id. at 438.
78. Id.; see also id. at 451–52 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] city must have latitude to
experiment, at least at the outset. . . . [I]f its inferences appear reasonable, we should not say
there is no basis for its conclusion.”).
79. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion) (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 438–39.
82. Id. at 439.
83. Id. (quoting Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 52).
84. Id. at 439–40.
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In many cases, this would leave the city with “no means to address
the secondary effects with which it is concerned.”85
The consistent emphasis in Alameda Books and the cases
preceding it is that the initial burden of proof placed on cities
addressing negative secondary effects incident to adult businesses is
not exacting. Indeed, the Court in its most recent decision took care
to clarify that the initial bar is not high:86 cities can rely on evidence
that is “reasonably believed to be relevant”87 as long as it is not
“shoddy,” meaning it “fairly support[s] the municipality’s rationale
for its ordinance.”88 This evidence can include studies conducted in
other cities reasonably analogized to the current city’s situation.89
B. Applying Alameda Books: Confusion Among the Circuits
In the wake of the Alameda Books decision, the question
currently vexing the Fifth and Tenth Circuits is whether a study that
does not distinguish between different classes of sexually oriented
businesses “fairly support[s] the [city’s] rationale for [an] ordinance”
affecting off-site sexually oriented businesses.90 This section will

85. Id. at 440.
86. Id. at 438.
87. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 51.
88. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438.
89. See id. at 439–40; see also Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 51–52.
90. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. Although the Eight Circuit, in ILQ Inv., Inc. v.
City of Rochester, addressed this same question and held that the ordinance in question
sufficiently showed a substantial government interest, this case was decided before Alameda
Books and its admonition against shoddy evidence. ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25
F.3d 1413, 1418 (8th Cir. 1994) (“So long as [an ordinance] affects only categories of
businesses reasonably believed to produce at least some of the unwanted secondary effects, [a
city] must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly
serious problems.” (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976))).
This question has also been considered by the Ninth Circuit in World Wide Video, Inc. v. City
of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004). However, there the court chose not to decide
whether an on- and off-site distinction was constitutionally relevant because the city provided
sufficient evidence, including “studies, police records, and citizen testimony,” concerning the
negative secondary effects associated with both on- and off-site sexually oriented businesses. Id.
at 1197 (“[I]n this case we can assume, but need not decide, that the distinction between
retail-only stores and stores with preview booths is constitutionally relevant.”). Because this
decision only addresses the on- and off-site distinction in dicta it will not be addressed in this
Comment. However, it is interesting to note that this court seems to hold the city to an even
lower burden than the Tenth Circuit—specifically, the court uses the opinion of a pedodontist
working near an off-site sexually oriented business concerning his own subjective observations.
Id. Surely, if this evidence can be seen as reasonably relevant and fairly supporting a city’s
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examine how each of these two circuits has interpreted the Supreme
Court’s decisions and the reasoning behind each circuit’s
interpretation.
1. The Fifth Circuit
The decision in Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio91 is the
governing case law on this issue for the Fifth Circuit. Encore Videos
examined a city ordinance passed by San Antonio in 1995, which
prohibited “sexually oriented businesses from locating within 1,000
feet of residential areas.”92 The city based its decision on evidence of
negative secondary effects.93 The plaintiff—an owner of a sexually
oriented retail video store that fell within the city’s definition of a
sexually oriented business—brought suit under the First
Amendment.94
The district court granted summary judgment for San Antonio
and the plaintiff appealed.95 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the
ordinance under the standard set forth in Renton.96 The court agreed
with the district court that the ordinance was content-neutral and
served a substantial government interest.97 However, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court as to the issue of whether the

rationale, a properly conducted study that does not distinguish between different adult
businesses will as well, absent evidence presented to the contrary.
91. 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003).
92. Id. at 290.
93. Id. at 294. The ordinance was enacted to “reduce the adverse secondary effects
(such as increased crime and the reduction of property values) of sexually oriented businesses.”
Id.
94. Id. at 290. The ordinance “[prohibited] sexually oriented businesses from being
within 1000 feet of other sexually oriented businesses or residential areas, churches, schools, or
parks.” Id. at 294.
95. Id. at 290.
96. Id. at 292. The court adds an additional prong, holding that the ordinance must be
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at 291 (quoting Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)). Although this is not specifically listed as a requirement in
Renton, which stated that a regulation is acceptable if “designed to serve a substantial
government interest,” the Court did expressly find that “the Renton ordinance is ‘narrowly
tailored’ to affect only that category of theatres shown to produce the unwanted . . . effects.”
Id. (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)). Other
decisions have supported the view that a time, place, and manner ordinance must be narrowly
tailored. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989); Frisby, 487 U.S. at
481; Doctor John’s Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1164 (10th Cir. 2006); Z.J. Gifts D2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 1998).
97. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 292–93.
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ordinance was narrowly tailored, holding that “in order to
demonstrate that the ordinance is narrowly tailored,” the city had to
show that the ordinance addressed the secondary effects at which it
was aimed. 98
The court reasoned that San Antonio’s ordinance was not
narrowly tailored to address a substantial government interest for
two reasons.99 First, the municipality had defined “sexually oriented
business” too broadly to be justified by the evidence it offered in
support of its actions.100 Second—and more importantly for our
purposes—the ordinance applied equally to both on- and off-site
sexually oriented businesses, but the studies that the ordinance relied
upon for its evidentiary basis either “entirely excluded” off-site
businesses or did “not differentiate the data collected” from that of
their on-site counterparts.101 Reasoning that off-site sexually oriented
businesses differed from on-site businesses because the customers
“are less likely to linger in the area and engage in public alcohol
consumption and other undesirable activities,” the court held that a
city is required to present “at least some substantial evidence of the
secondary effects” stemming from off-site sexually oriented
businesses.102 The court stated that ruling otherwise may subject
“even ordinary bookstores and video stores with adult sections” to
regulation without evidence of secondary effects.103 In reaching this
decision, the court argued that its holding was not contrary to the
standard set forth in Alameda Books because, in that case, the city
had presented more compelling evidence in the form of its own
study supporting the ordinance at issue.104

98. Id. at 294.
99. A few months after its decision in Encore Videos, the court issued a clarifying opinion
stating, in relevant part, that “the ordinance at issue was found not to be narrowly tailored
because of both its failure to make an on-site/off-site distinction and its low 20% inventory
requirement.” Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 352 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir.
2003).
100. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 294. The ordinance applied to “any bookstore, novelty
store, or video store that devotes over 20% of its inventory or floor space to sexually explicit
materials.” Id. The court feared that this definition was so broad that it could apply “to many
garden-variety book or music stores with restricted adult sections.” Id. at n.7.
101. Id. at 294–95. San Antonio relied on three studies of secondary effects: “one in
Seattle, Washington, in 1989, another in Austin, Texas, in 1986, and the third in Garden
Grove, California, in 1991.” Id. at 294.
102. Id. at 295.
103. Id. at 295–96.
104. Id. at 295 n.10.
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2. The Tenth Circuit
In Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy105 the Tenth Circuit
considered this issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alameda Books.106 In May 2001, the city of Roy, Utah, enacted an
ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses in an effort to
address negative secondary effects.107 As evidence of these effects, the
city included findings based on “case law, Congressional testimony,
research papers, and various studies from other areas.”108 In
response, Doctor John’s, a retail store that “stocks a variety of ‘adult’
products,”109 filed suit, alleging, among other things, that the
ordinance was “not narrowly tailored to regulate only businesses that
produce adverse ‘secondary effects.’”110 Specifically, Dr. John’s
argued that “the studies cited in support of the Roy City ordinance
do not consider businesses . . . that sell materials only for off-site
consumption.”111
In considering the ordinance, the court first held that, under
Alameda Books, the city bears the initial “burden of providing
105. 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006).
106. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit, in Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora,
had previously considered the issue of whether a city must provide independent evidence of the
secondary effects of off-site businesses to justify a zoning ordinance affecting these businesses.
136 F.3d 683, 687–90 (10th Cir. 1998). The court held that even if an off-site sexually
oriented business is “a new type of adult business, it may not avoid time, place and manner
regulation that has been justified by studies of the secondary effects of reasonably similar
businesses.” Id. at 690 (quoting ILQ Invs., Inc., v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418
(8th Cir. 1994)). Because this case was decided before Alameda Books, this Comment will not
consider its rulings except as incorporated by the Tenth Circuit in Doctor John’s.
107. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170–71 (D. Utah
2004).
108. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1154.
109. Id. at 1153. Dr. John’s stocks a variety of goods ranging from “lingerie, swimwear,
lotions, oils, games, roses, [and] stuffed animals” to “‘marital aids’ and ‘adult toys’ including
‘vibrators,’ ‘dildos,’ and other masturbation toys, as well as videotapes, DVDs, magazines, and
books . . . some explicitly sexual in nature.” Doctor John’s, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (internal
citations omitted). The owner, John K. Coil, decided to open a store in Utah “based on the
perceived need for pornography” in that state. Id. John recalls:
I was in Los Angeles and I read the newspaper on a Sunday morning, and there was
an article in there that said that the State of Utah had appointed an anti-porn czar.
And I had never been to Utah before. I had no knowledge that Utah existed except
seeing it on a map, but I thought to myself and said out loud to those people
around me, “There’s some uptight people. They need a porn store.”
Id. (quoting Deposition of John K. Coil at 19–20).
110. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1156.
111. Id. at 1164.
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evidence of secondary effects.”112 The court explained that in
meeting that burden “cities are entitled to rely, in part, on [an]
‘appeal to common sense,’ rather than ‘empirical data,’ at least where
there is no ‘actual and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the
contrary.’”113 However, the municipality could not use “shoddy data
or reasoning”—it “must fairly support the municipality’s rationale
for its ordinance.”114 The court then turned its attention to Doctor
John’s contention that the city’s evidence must specifically show a
link between off-site sexually oriented businesses and the cited
secondary effects.115
The court began by noting its previous decision in Z.J. Gifts D-2
v. City of Aurora, where the Tenth Circuit had previously “rejected
the on-site/off-site distinction as a basis for striking down an adult
business ordinance.”116 In Z.J. Gifts, the court concluded that a
sexually oriented business providing only off-site adult material was
still subject to regulations “‘justified by studies of the secondary
effects of reasonably similar businesses.’”117 The court reasoned that
under this precedent, “the mere fact that the ordinance reaches offsite as well as on-site businesses is insufficient” to hold the ordinance
unconstitutional.118 However, Dr. John’s argued that Z.J. Gifts
needed to be re-examined after Alameda Books, which increased “the
initial burden that [a] City must meet to justify [an] ordinance.”119
The court declined to adopt this view; instead, it reasoned that,
under Alameda Books, “a city does not face a ‘high bar’ in meeting
its initial obligation to show an ordinance is narrowly tailored,” and
the standard requires only that the “[city’s] evidence ‘fairly supports’
its rationale.”120 Thus, the court interpreted Alameda Books as

112. Id. (quoting Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1197 n.8 (10th Cir.
2003).
113. Id. at 1165 (quoting Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1199).
114. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 1166–68.
116. Id. at 1167 (citing Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683 (10th
Cir. 1998)); see supra note 106 (discussing Z.J. Gifts and its on-site/off-site distinction).
117. Id. (citing Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 690).
118. Id. at 1167.
119. Id. (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 1167–68 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438
(2002) (plurality opinion)). The court also cited Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
Alameda Books stating, “‘very little evidence is required’ to justify a secondary effects
ordinance.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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allowing cities to rely on studies showing the “secondary effects of
reasonably similar businesses.”121 However, the court did not go so
far as to treat the on- and off-site distinction as irrelevant. Instead,
the court ruled that
although a city need not initially come forward with specific
evidence of a connection between negative secondary effects and
each precise type of business regulated under its ordinance, a
plaintiff may be able to challenge a city’s rationale for its ordinance
by pointing to evidence that its type of adult business (e.g., “offsite”) is relevantly different than those types of businesses analyzed
in the studies supporting the ordinance (e.g. “on-site”).122

The court qualified this statement with the admonition that the
party opposing the government would need to do more than
“[s]imply stat[e] that off-site businesses are different from on-site
businesses” to shift the burden of proof to the municipality.123 The
court then remanded to the district court for a determination of
whether Doctor John’s had presented evidence sufficient to cast
doubt on the city’s evidence.124
IV. MEETING THE INITIAL BURDEN: FOLLOWING
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
This section argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach has
correctly interpreted the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Under the
Tenth Circuit’s standard, cities are not relying on “shoddy data or
reasoning”125 when their ordinances are supported by studies
showing the negative effects of “reasonably similar businesses.”126
The distinction between different adult businesses should not be
121. Id. at 1167 (quoting Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 690).
122. Id. at 1168. Indeed, this is the very position that this Comment takes. Although the
differences between these types of businesses should be taken into account, the differences
should not determine a city’s ability to meet its initial burden in support of its ordinance. See
infra Part IV.
123. Id. In the opinion, the court indicates that Dr. John’s had presented no evidence
“showing that off-site [sexually oriented businesses] have materially different secondary effects
that would call into question the studies relied upon by Roy City.” Id.
124. Id. at 1173. Upon remand the district found that Doctor John’s evidence was
insufficient “to cast doubt on the City’s rationale or the factual basis behind the city of Roy’s
sexually-oriented business ordinance.” Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, No. 1:03-cv-00081,
2007 WL 1302757, slip opinion at *1 (D. Utah May 2, 2007).
125. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438.
126. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1167.
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ignored; nevertheless, the burden to demonstrate the relevance of a
distinction between different adult businesses should rest on the
business that is challenging the act in the litigation process, rather
than as part of a city’s initial burden. This approach will preserve the
deference that the Supreme Court has shown to cities.
Part A of this section will explain why the Tenth Circuit’s
practice of allowing cities to rely on data gathered from reasonably
similar adult businesses, instead of requiring separate evidence for
each new type of adult business, is the correct interpretation of
Alameda Books. Part B will show how this standard provides cities
with the correct level of deference in dealing with the secondary
effects attributable to various adult businesses, while still ensuring
that a city’s initial burden does not constitute a rubber stamp.
Finally, Part C will address when courts should consider the
differences between different types of sexually oriented businesses.
A. Showing a Substantial Government Interest: A City’s
Initial Burden
The Tenth Circuit’s standard, which allows cities to meet their
initial burden by relying on studies of “reasonably similar
businesses,”127 does not constitute Alameda Books’ prohibited
reliance on “shoddy data or reasoning.”128 Rather, looking to
“reasonably similar businesses” satisfies the initial burden set forth by
the Supreme Court in Alameda Books and its predecessors. In its
earlier decision in Renton, the Supreme Court held that, in meeting
their initial burden, cities are not required to “produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities, so long
as [the] evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be
relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”129 Repeating this
standard, the Alameda Books Court specifically refused to raise the
initial burden a city faces any higher than in Renton, adding only
that the evidence must “fairly support the municipality’s rationale for
its ordinance”130—a very low initial burden to meet.
127. Id.
128. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438.
129. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (emphasis
added).
130. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. Although this is a plurality opinion, Justice
Kennedy agreed that the plurality gave “the correct answer” to the amount of evidence needed
to meet a city’s initial burden in justifying an ordinance affecting sexually oriented businesses
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The Court does not even require that a study actually be
relevant, just that the city “reasonably believe[s]” that it is.131
Relevance only requires that the evidence have “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence . . . more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”132
A study showing negative effects of a similar adult business is
certainly a relevant fact, or at the very least, a city can reasonably
believe it to be relevant. Additionally, evidence of secondary effects
incident to one type of adult business fairly supports an inference by
cities that similar businesses may produce similar effects. The Tenth
Circuit’s allowance of reasonable reliance by cities properly complies
with the standard set forth by the Supreme Court.
The facts of prior Supreme Court decisions support the view that
the Tenth Circuit’s standard does not constitute a reliance on
“shoddy data or reasoning,” as prohibited by Alameda Books.
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly used the language
“reasonably similar businesses,” its decisions up to this point have
nevertheless applied such a standard. For example, in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc.133 the Court allowed a municipality to rely on evidence
showing a correlation between adult theaters and harmful secondary
effects “to support its claim that nude dancing,” a reasonably similar
business, was “likely to produce the same effects” as an adult
theater.134 Similarly, the Court’s decision in Renton, allowing a city
to rely on studies conducted in other cities, supports the Tenth
Circuit’s doctrine. The Court allowed the city of Renton to make the
reasonable inference, based on studies of adult business in other
cities, that similar adult businesses in its own city would produce
similar secondary effects.135
The Court’s decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit in Alameda
Books is another example where the Court allowed a municipality to
rely on studies of reasonably similar businesses without actually
stating it was doing so. The Ninth Circuit originally invalidated the
ordinance at issue in Alameda Books because it found that the city

and also stated himself that “at least at the outset, . . . very little evidence is required.” Id. at
449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 438.
132. FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
133. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
134. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (explaining Barnes).
135. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986).
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could not reasonably rely on a study showing the secondary effects of
a concentration of separately housed adult businesses but not the
effects of “a concentration of adult operations within a single adult
establishment,” to justify an ordinance regulating such
establishments.136 In essence, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the
ordinance because it regulated one type of adult business based on a
study showing the negative secondary effects associated with similar
adult businesses. The Supreme Court overruled this decision,
effectively holding that it is reasonable for cities to draw inferences
from studies concerning reasonably similar adult businesses.137 While
cities cannot “get away with shoddy data or reasoning,” a
municipality’s evidence must simply “fairly support [its] rationale.”138
Thus, although the Supreme Court has not expressly stated that
cities can rely on studies of “reasonably similar businesses,” the
Tenth Circuit’s standard, which allows such reliance, is the correct
interpretation of Alameda Books.
Like the reversed Ninth Circuit decision in Alameda Books, the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio139
sets the initial burden a city must meet too high by requiring direct
evidence of the negative secondary effects of the specific type of adult
businesses being regulated. The Fifth Circuit invalidated the
ordinance at issue in Encore Videos because the studies used to justify
the ordinance either did not include off-site businesses or failed to
differentiate the data collected from on-site businesses.140 It justified
this decision by reasoning that “[i]f consumers of pornography
cannot view the materials at the sexually oriented establishment, they
[will be] less likely to linger in the area and engage in public alcohol
136. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436; see also Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Los Angeles has presented no evidence that a
combination adult bookstore/arcade produces any of the harmful secondary effects identified
in the Study. . . . [T]he 1977 study [] contains no findings that an individual combination
bookstore/arcade produces any of the increased crime the Study found resulting from a
concentration of adult businesses. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the City to infer that absent
its regulations, a bookstore/arcade combination would have harmful secondary effects.”).
137. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436 (holding that it was reasonable “for Los Angeles to
suppose that a concentration of adult establishments is correlated with high crime rates because
a concentration of operations in one locale draws, for example, a greater concentration of adult
consumers to the neighborhood, and a high density of such consumers either attracts or
generates criminal activity”).
138. Id. at 438.
139. Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003).
140. Id. at 294–95.
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consumption and other undesirable activities.”141 Thus, their
argument was that off-site sexually oriented businesses are “less likely
to create harmful secondary effects,” so zoning ordinances regulating
them cannot be justified absent direct evidence of these effects.142
While the Fifth Circuit’s argument is reasonable, it is simply not
a proper consideration for cities in meeting their initial burden under
Alameda Books, which requires only that a city’s evidence “fairly
support [its] rationale for its ordinance[s]” by evidence “reasonably
believed to be relevant.”143 Even if these secondary effects are less, it
is reasonable, absent evidence to the contrary, to believe that off-site
businesses have enough effects in common with on-site businesses to
create a substantial government interest in regulating them.144
Although the Fifth Circuit attempted to argue that their decision was
not contrary to Alameda Books,145 the city in Alameda Books did not
provide direct evidence in support of its ordinance but instead relied
upon reasonable inferences that the city’s evidence would support its
regulation. Encore Videos should have been no different. A city may
make reasonable inferences between similar businesses in meeting its
initial burden.
Under the Tenth Circuit’s standard, which allows reliance upon
studies of “reasonably similar businesses” in meeting a city’s initial
burden,146 the outcome of Encore Videos likely would have been
different. The ordinance at issue in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

141. Id. at 295.
142. Id.
143. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (citation omitted).
144. See H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2007),
for a recent example. In this case, the court found that some negative effects relating to real
estate value accompanied adult businesses equally, regardless of an on- or off-site classification:
[T]he Indianapolis survey also asked respondents to explain their prediction that an
adult bookstore would negatively impact property value: 29% believed such an
establishment would attract ‘undesirables’ to the neighborhood, 14% felt it would
create a bad image of the area, and 15% felt that it offended prevailing community
attitudes. These reasons are equally applicable to an on-site or off-site establishment,
and are distinguishable from the problems we have found to be unique to on-site
businesses.
Id. (emphasis added).
145. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 295–96 n.10 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in
Alameda Books is not to the contrary. . . . Clearly, that study, unlike the studies presented in
this case, directly supported the specific regulation at issue in [that case].”).
146. Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1166 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 690 (10th Cir. 1998)).
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Encore Videos relied on three studies from other cities: Seattle,
Washington; Austin, Texas; and Garden Grove, California.147 The
court did not mention any flaws with the studies themselves or state
that the studies did not adequately show a correlation between onsite sexually oriented businesses and negative secondary effects. The
court gave only one reason for why these studies were insufficient:
one did not include off-site adult businesses and the other two did
not differentiate between data collected from on-site businesses and
their off-site cousins—even though the Austin study included
information from two adult bookstores.148 Given that “very little
evidence is required”149 to meet its initial burden, it would seem
reasonable for a city to believe, based on these studies, that
businesses selling the same sorts of material and dealing with the
same subject matter as their on-site counterparts would generate
some of the same secondary effects. In the absence of evidence

147. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 294.
148. Id. at 294–95, 295 n.9. Opponents of zoning ordinances often contend that studies,
which at first blush appear to include off-site businesses, do not actually support a city’s initial
burden because—within the “adult industry”—the terms used in these studies are understood
as applying to on-site instead of off-site establishments. See H & A Land Corp., 480 F.3d at
340 (“[B]ookstore . . . is a term of art and does not sufficiently specify off-site premises. . . .
[I]nstead . . . adult bookstores often include peep shows, arcades, and other forms of on-site
entertainment, rendering them on-site establishments.”); Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 687 (“Z.J.
Gifts argues and attempts to prove that all other adult bookstores provide some form of onpremises viewing of sexually explicit materials.”); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d
1413, 1418 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting the owner of a sexually oriented business stating that
“on-premise viewing booths” were “an absolute essential component of the 70 adult
bookstores in 25 states that he [had] personally visited.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Grappling with this issue while still abiding by its precedent, the Fifth Circuit recently rejected
the argument that “adult bookstore” is a term of art implying an on-site business, and upheld a
zoning ordinance affecting off-site adult businesses because it was based on studies, which
“included surveys of real estate appraisers that focused strictly on ‘adult bookstores.’” H & A
Land Corp., 480 F.3d at 339–40 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that whether the
survey included off-site establishments or was limited to consideration of on-site businesses
depended largely on how the real estate agents would understand the term “adult bookstore.”
Id. Then, pointing to the common dictionary definition of “bookstore,” instead of the
specialized definition offered by sexually oriented businesses, the court concluded it was
“reasonable for [the city] to believe” that those participating in the survey “understood the
term ‘adult bookstore’ to mean off-site businesses.” Id. at 340. Thus, while the Fifth Circuit
has set the city’s initial burden higher than the Supreme Court contemplated for cities, it has
correctly refused to adopt the specialized definition of “adult bookstore” in connection to
secondary effect studies.
149. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 451 (2002) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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showing otherwise, it is likely that these studies “fairly support the
municipality’s rationale.”150
B. Deference: Dealing with a “New Type” of Adult Business
The hypothetical outcome in Encore Videos discussed above
would also have been entirely consistent with the level of deference
cities receive in meeting their initial burden under the Supreme
Court’s standard. Throughout its opinions on this issue, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that “a city’s ‘interest in attempting
to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded
high respect.’”151 The Court provides a high level of deference to
allow cities to use their “zoning power in a reasonable way to
ameliorate [secondary effects] without suppressing speech.”152
However, the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that a city provide “some
substantial evidence of secondary effects specific to” each type of
regulated adult business in meeting its initial burden, does not take
into account the deference that the Supreme Court has attempted to
provide cities.153 As a result, if followed, the Fifth Circuit’s standard
will substantially limit a city’s ability to deal with new types of adult
businesses in the future.
In light of the Fifth Circuit’s current standard, there is no doubt
that cities are now attempting to find or conduct studies that include
off-site businesses to support their ordinances, and some already have
found such studies.154 However, the Fifth Circuit’s holding has the
potential to stretch beyond its current application to off-site
businesses by allowing an adult business, wishing to dispute an
otherwise valid zoning ordinance, to claim that it is simply a
“‘different kind’ of adult business” not covered in the existing
studies justifying the ordinance.155 It is unlikely that for each
“different kind of adult business” there will be sufficient
differentiated evidence readily available for cities to cite. A city will

150. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion).
151. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (quoting Young
v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion)); see also Alameda
Books, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444.
153. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 295.
154. See, e.g., H & A Land Corp., v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2007).
155. Doctor John’s v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1165 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1199 (10th Cir. 2003)).
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therefore have to conduct its own study or simply wait to address
potentially serious problems until another city conducts a study upon
which it can rely. The sheer cost of conducting these studies will
effectively prevent smaller cities like Kennedale, Texas, with an
estimated population of 6450 people,156 or Roy, Utah—population
35,100157—from enacting ordinances to address secondary effects.
Even larger cities like Los Angeles, which boasts a modest estimate
of 9,948,081 residents,158 will encounter difficulties paying for new
studies for each “new type” of adult business.159 It is for this very
reason that the Supreme Court has maintained such a low initial
burden allowing a municipality to rely on the experiences of other
cities “if its inferences appear reasonable.”160
Additionally, even if a city could afford to conduct one or two
studies to address new types of adult businesses, the Fifth Circuit’s
standard imposes no limit to the distinctions that an adult business
can employ to claim it is a “new type” of adult business. Once
enough cities have conducted research showing the negative
secondary effects of off-site businesses, the controversy will not end.
Instead, adult-business owners will likely attempt to distinguish their
businesses in other ways in order to escape legitimate zoning
ordinances. For example, a strip club or topless bar that caters only
to high-class customers or business types will not attract the seedier
customers, and thus the owner could claim that the secondary effects
are fewer than another adult establishment. An adult bookstore

156. City of Kennedale, Texas Web site, About Kennedale, http://
www.gokennedale.com/admin/contentx/default.cfm?PageId=8505 (last visited Oct. 28,
2008).
157. U.S. Census Bureau, Roy (city) QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/49/4965110.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
158. U.S.
Census
Bureau,
Los
Angeles
County
QuickFacts,
http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
159. Just a few short years ago, California faced major budget crises that ultimately
resulted in a recall election in which Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected. See, e.g., Charlie
LeDuff, The California Recall: The Governor-elect; A Sudden, Decisive Victory for a Newcomer to
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A26; Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; California’s Longterm Economic Problems Need Long-term Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at C2.
However, even the power of “the Terminator” (Schwarzenegger) has not been able to fend off
continuing crises with California’s budget. See, e.g., Matthew Yi, Budget Bombshell: Governor
Boosts Deficit Forecast to $20 Billion as He Bids to Change State’s Spending System, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 30, 2008, at A1.
160. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 452 (2002) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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owner who only deals in soft-core pornography could argue that the
bookstore creates fewer secondary effects than bookstores carrying
hard-core pornography. A strictly gay adult bookstore might claim
different secondary effects than a store offering a wider variety of
products. Or the owner of a topless bar where pasties are worn might
contend that the business is responsible for fewer secondary effects
than a fully nude strip club. The distinctions can be almost endless
for a creative mind, and under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, a city will
have to find “at least some substantial evidence of the secondary
effects” specific to these new establishments before their regulations
can apply.161 The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Alameda Books,
allowing cities to rely on studies of “reasonably similar businesses” in
meeting their initial burden, makes more sense for cities, especially in
light of the Supreme Court’s efforts to give deference to cities’
ability to zone and regulate adult businesses.
The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the Alameda Books
standard maintains a lower bar for cities attempting to meet their
initial burden of evidence; however, it does not constitute a rubber
stamp but ensures that cities are not relying on “shoddy data or
reasoning.”162 In Abilene Retail #30, Inc. v. Board of
Commissioners,163 the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s ruling
in favor of a rural county because there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether it met its initial burden when it enacted a
zoning ordinance affecting an adult bookstore.164 However, this
decision was not based on the sufficiency of studies relied on by the
city, but rather because city officials changed the required distance
between sexually oriented businesses and private residences from 750
feet to 1200 feet after discovering in a public meeting that 750 feet
would not force the only sexually oriented business in town to
move.165 The court stated that the “[o]rdinance plainly contemplates
the closure of [the adult business] in its existing location, a location
that a common sense reading of the Board’s studies suggests would
best limit any secondary effects.”166 Under these facts the court was

161. Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 295 (5th Cir. 2003).
162. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438.
163. 492 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2007).
164. Id. at 1167.
165. Id. at 1169. The adult business (The Lion’s Den) was actually 1150 feet from the
nearest home, next to the interstate.
166. Id. at 1177.
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concerned that city officials had not “reasonably relied on studies
analyzing the secondary effects of adult businesses.”167 A city can rely
on studies of reasonably similar businesses, but the studies must
“‘fairly support[]’ its rationale.”168
C. A Different Kind of Adult Business: Proper Consideration of the
Off-Site Distinction
Finally, while the city’s initial burden of proof does not require
consideration of the distinction between on- and off-site businesses,
this does not mean that the distinction should—or even can—be
ignored. Under the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Alameda Books,
the on- and off-site distinction is properly considered once a city has
met its initial burden of support for its ordinance and the burden has
passed to the plaintiff.169 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit maintained
that an opponent of a zoning ordinance can come forward with
evidence showing that a “type of adult business (e.g., ‘off-site’) is
relevantly different than those types of businesses analyzed in the
studies supporting the ordinance (e.g., ‘on-site’).”170 However,
unlike the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an opponent’s naked assertion
“that off-site businesses are different from on-site businesses is not
sufficient to shift the burden back to the city.”171 Rather, opponents
must present evidence supporting their claims. Once a plaintiff has
presented evidence that casts direct doubt on a city’s rationale, the
burden will shift back to the city to provide further substantial
evidence that off-site businesses cause the negative secondary effects
at issue.172
Considering the distinction between on- and off-site sexually
oriented businesses later in the burden-shifting scheme is consistent
with Alameda Books and its policies. While the Alameda Books Court
has cautioned that cities cannot rely on “shoddy” evidence in
justifying an ordinance, the Court never meant to raise the initial bar
that a city must meet. The Tenth Circuit’s practice of putting the
167. Id. at 1167.
168. Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality
decision)).
169. Id. at 1168.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439.
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burden on opponents to “cast doubt on [a municipality’s] evidence
and rationale”173 is consistent with the Supreme Court’s policy of
“deference to the evidence presented by the city” and its
acknowledgement that “cities are ‘in a better position than the
Judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems.’”174 As such,
the burden of proving that a study relied upon by a city improperly
attributed on-site secondary effects to off-site businesses should rest
on the sexually oriented business challenging the ordinance.
The Supreme Court’s admonition against “shoddy” evidence
does not mean that it is necessary for a city, when meeting its initial
burden of proof by showing a substantial government interest, to
provide studies specifically addressing the secondary effects of off-site
sexually oriented business or any other type of new adult business for
that matter. Rather, as the Tenth Circuit stated in Doctor John’s, a
city can rely on evidence, which, while not directly supporting the
rationale behind the city’s ordinance, is nevertheless based on studies
concerning reasonably similar businesses.175 Requiring otherwise is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Alameda Books
and will unnecessarily impede good faith efforts by city councils, as
well as undermine a municipality’s latitude to “experiment with
solutions to admittedly serious problems,” in addressing the
secondary effects of different types of sexually oriented businesses.176
Proper consideration of the differences between reasonably similar
adult businesses should not be ignored, but it must not become part
of a city’s initial burden of proving a substantial government interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Like it or not, the adult entertainment industry is here to stay.
While the owners and operators of establishments catering to the
demands generated by this business have legitimate rights under the
First Amendment, municipalities must also be free to respond to
negative secondary effects that are incident to these types of
operations. The Supreme Court has recognized this need and
protected a city’s ability to enact content-neutral zoning ordinances

173. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1169.
174. Id. at 1168 (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440).
175. Id. at 1150.
176. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)).
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aimed at reducing these secondary effects. Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit has improperly interpreted the initial evidentiary burden that
a city must meet in justifying these ordinances. Although a city
cannot rely on “shoddy” evidence when enacting such ordinances,
the Supreme Court’s standard does not require municipalities, in
meeting their initial burden, to find or conduct new studies each
time an affected adult business claims that it is a new or different
kind of sexually oriented business. Rather, as the Tenth Circuit
holds, cities must be allowed to rely on “studies of the secondary
effects of reasonably similar businesses.”177 While distinctions
between different adult businesses are important considerations, they
are properly considered after the city has met its initial burden of
proof and the plaintiff has provided evidence that casts doubt upon
the city’s rationale. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit’s approach, which
defers consideration of the on- and off-site distinction until later
stages of litigation, properly interprets the Supreme Court’s standard
by providing initial deference to cities while still ensuring that they
are not ultimately relying on “shoddy data or reasoning.”178
Brigman L. Harman

177. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora,
136 F.3d 683, 690 (10th Cir. 1998)).
178. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality decision).
 Thanks are due to Professor Margaret Tarkington for her advice and encouragement
throughout this process; Richard Salgado and Edward Thomas for their invaluable input and
suggestions; and my wife Amy, who surely did not envision late night discussions about zoning
adult businesses when she agreed to marry me.
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